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Abstract
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) provides a very ex-
pressive framework for multi-agent planning that
can deal with nondeterminism, partial observabil-
ity, sensing actions, and arbitrary nesting of be-
liefs about other agents’ beliefs. However, as we
show in this paper, this expressiveness comes at
a price. The planning framework is undecidable,
even if we allow only purely epistemic actions (ac-
tions that change only beliefs, not ontic facts). Un-
decidability holds already in the S5 setting with at
least 2 agents, and even with 1 agent in S4. It shows
that multi-agent planning is robustly undecidable if
we assume that agents can reason with an arbitrary
nesting of beliefs about beliefs. We also prove a
corollary showing undecidability of the DEL model
checking problem with the star operator on actions
(iteration).
1 Introduction
Recently a number of authors have independently started
developing new and very expressive frameworks for auto-
mated planning based on dynamic epistemic logic [Bolan-
der and Andersen, 2011; Lo¨we et al., 2011; Aucher, 2012;
Pardo and Sadrzadeh, 2012]. Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL)
extends ordinary modal epistemic logic [Hintikka, 1962] by
the inclusion of event models to describe actions, and a prod-
uct update operator that defines how epistemic models are
updated as the consequence of executing actions described
through event models [Baltag et al., 1998]. Using epistemic
models as states, event models as actions, and the product
operator as state transition function, one immediately gets a
planning formalism based on DEL.
One of the main advantages of this formalism is expres-
siveness. Letting states of planning tasks be epistemic models
implies that we have something that generalizes belief states,
the classical approach to planning with nondeterminism and
partial observability [Ghallab et al., 2004].1 Compared to
1A belief state can be modeled as a set of propositional valu-
ations, which again can be modeled as a connected S5 model of
epistemic logic.
standard planning formalisms using belief states, the DEL-
based approach has the advantage that actions (event models)
encode both nondeterminism and partial observability [An-
dersen et al., 2012], and hence that observability can be ac-
tion dependent, and we don’t need observation functions on
top of action descriptions. Active sensing actions are also ex-
pressible in the DEL-based framework. Another advantage
of the DEL-based framework is that it generalizes immedi-
ately to the multi-agent case. Both epistemic logic and DEL
are by default multi-agent formalisms, and the single-agent
situation is simply a special case. Hence the formalism pro-
vides a planning framework for multi-agent planning integrat-
ing nondeterminism and partial observability. It can be used
both for adversarial and cooperative multi-agent planning. Fi-
nally, the underlying epistemic logic also allows agents to
represent their beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, hence
allowing them to do Theory of Mind modeling. Theory of
Mind (ToM) is a concept from cognitive psychology referring
to the ability of attributing mental states (beliefs, intentions,
etc.) to other agents [Premack and Woodruff, 1978]. Having
a ToM is essential for successful social interaction in human
agents [Baron-Cohen, 1997], hence can be expected to play
an equally important role in the construction of socially intel-
ligent artificial agents.
The flip side of the expressivity advantages of the DEL-
based planning framework is that the plan existence prob-
lem is undecidable in the unrestricted framework. This was
proven in [Bolander and Andersen, 2011] by an encoding of
Turing machines as 3-agent planning tasks (leading to a re-
duction of the Turing machine halting problem to the 3-agent
plan existence problem). The proof made essential use of
actions with postconditions, that is, ontic actions that make
factual changes to the world (e.g. writing a symbol to a tape
cell of a Turing machine). One could speculate that unde-
cidability relied essentially on the inclusion of ontic actions,
but in the present paper we prove this not to be the case. We
prove that plan existence is undecidable even when only al-
lowing purely epistemic (non-ontic) actions, and already for
2 agents. This is by an encoding of two-counter machines as
planning tasks. We also prove that even single-agent planning
is undecidable on S4 frames.
Given that we deal with multi-agent situations, it is im-
portant to specify our modeling approach, and in particular
whether the modeler/planner is one of the agents. A classifi-
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cation of the different modeling approaches and their respec-
tive formalisms can be found in [Aucher, 2010]. For ease of
presentation, we follow in this article the perfect external ap-
proach of (dynamic) epistemic logic and model the situation
from an external and omniscient point of view. This said, all
our results in this article transfer to the other modeling ap-
proaches if we replace epistemic models with internal mod-
els or imperfect external (i.e. multi-pointed) models, which,
as we said, generalize to a multi-agent setting the belief states
of classical planning [Bolander and Andersen, 2011] .
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we re-
call the core of the DEL framework. In Section 3, we relate
our DEL-based approach to the classical planning approach
and provide an example of an epistemic multi-agent planning
task. In Section 4, we introduce two-counter machines which
are used in Sections 5 and 6 to prove our undecidability re-
sults. In Section 7, we derive from our results the undecid-
ability of the DEL model checking problem (for the language
with the star operator on actions). Finally, we discuss related
work and end with some concluding remarks in Section 8. An
extended version of this article with more detailed proofs can
be found in [Aucher and Bolander, 2013].
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
In this section, we present the basic notions from DEL re-
quired for the rest of the article (see [Baltag et al., 1998;
van Ditmarsch et al., 2007; van Benthem, 2011] for more
details). Following the DEL methodology, we split our ex-
position into three subsections. In Section 2.1, we recall the
syntax and semantics of the epistemic language. In Section
2.2, we define event models, and in Section 2.3, we define
the product update. Finally, in Section 2.4, we define specific
classes of epistemic and event models that will be studied in
the sequel.
2.1 Epistemic Models
Throughout this article, P is a countable set of atomic propo-
sitions (propositional symbols) of cardinality at least two, and
A is a non-empty finite set of agents. We will use symbols
p, q, r, . . . for atomic propositions and numbers 0, 1, . . . for
agents. The epistemic language L(P,A) is generated by the
following BNF:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 2iφ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ A. As usual, the intended interpretation
of a formula 2iφ is “agent i believes φ” or “agent i knows
φ”. The formulas 3iφ, φ ∨ ψ and φ → ψ are abbreviations
of ¬2i¬φ, ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ), and ¬φ∨ψ respectively. We define
> as an abbreviation for p ∨ ¬p and ⊥ as an abbreviation for
p ∧ ¬p for some arbitrarily chosen p ∈ P . The semantics
of L(P,A) is defined as usual through Kripke models, here
called epistemic models.
Definition 1 (Epistemic models and states). An epistemic
model of L(P,A) is a triple M = (W,R, V ), where W ,
the domain, is a finite set of worlds; R : A → 2W×W
assigns an accessibility relation R(i) to each agent i ∈ A;
V : P → 2W assigns a set of worlds to each atomic proposi-
tion; this is the valuation of that variable. The relation R(i)
is usually abbreviated Ri, and we write v ∈ Ri(w) or wRiv
when (w, v) ∈ R(i). For w ∈ W , the pair (M, w) is called
an epistemic state of L(P,A).
Definition 2 (Truth conditions). Let an epistemic model
M = (W,R, V ) be given. Let i ∈ A, w ∈ W and
φ, ψ ∈ L(P,A). Then
(M, w) |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
(M, w) |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ
(M, w) |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= φ andM, w |= ψ
(M, w) |= 2iφ iff for all v ∈ Ri(w),M, v |= φ
Example 1. Consider the following epistemic state of
L({p}, {0, 1}).
(M, w1) = w1 :p
0, 1
w2
0, 1
0, 1
Each world is marked by its name followed by a list of the
propositional symbols being true at the world (which is pos-
sibly empty if none holds true). Edges are labelled with the
name of the relevant accessibility relations (agents). We have
e.g. (M, w1) |= ¬2ip ∧ ¬2i¬p for i = 0, 1: neither agent
knows the truth-value of p. For epistemic states (M, w) we
use the symbol to mark the designated world w.
2.2 Event Models
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) introduces the concept of
event model (or action model) for modeling the changes to
epistemic states brought about by the execution of actions
[Baltag et al., 1998; Baltag and Moss, 2004]. Intuitively, in
Definition 3 below, eQie′ means that while the possible event
represented by e is occurring, agent i considers it possible
that the event represented by e′ is in fact occurring.
Definition 3 (Event models and epistemic actions). An
event model of L(P,A) is a triple E = (E,Q, pre), where
E, the domain, is a finite non-empty set of events; Q : A →
2E×E assigns an accessibility relation Q(i) to each agent
i ∈ A; pre : E → L(P,A) assigns to each event a precon-
dition. The relation Q(i) is generally abbreviated Qi, and we
write v ∈ Qi(w) or wQiv when (w, v) ∈ Q(i). For e ∈ E,
(E , e) is called an epistemic action of L(P,A).
The event e in (E , e) is intended to denote the actual event
that takes place when the action is executed. Note that we
assume that events do not cause factual changes in the world.
Hence, we only consider so-called epistemic events and not
ontic events with postconditions, as in [van Ditmarsch et al.,
2005; van Benthem et al., 2006]. Our assumptions for dealing
with epistemic planning will therefore also differ from the
assumptions used in [Bolander and Andersen, 2011].
2.3 Product Update
Definition 4 (Applicability). An epistemic action (E , e) is
applicable in an epistemic state (M, w) if (M, w) |= pre(e).
The product update yields a new epistemic state (M, w)⊗
(E , e) representing how the new situation which was previ-
ously represented by (M, w) is perceived by the agents after
the occurrence of the event represented by (E , e).
Definition 5 (Product update). Given is an epistemic ac-
tion (E , e) applicable in an epistemic state (M, w), where
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L transitive Euclidean reflexive
K
KT X
K4 X
K45 X X
S4 X X
S5 X X X
Fig. 1: L-epistemic states and actions
M = (W,R, V ) and E = (E,Q, pre). The product up-
date of (M, w) with (E , e) is defined as the epistemic state
(M, w)⊗ (E , e) = ((W ′, R′, V ′), (w, e)), where
W ′ ={(w, e) ∈W × E | M, w |= pre(e)}
R′i ={((w, e), (v, f)) ∈W ′ ×W ′ | wRiv and eQif}
V ′(p) ={(w, e) ∈W ′ | M, w |= p}.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, the following is an ex-
ample of an applicable epistemic action of L({p}, {0, 1}) in
(M, w1):
(E1, e1) = e1 :p
0
e2 :>
0, 1
1
It corresponds to a private announcement of p to agent 0, that
is, agent 0 is told that p holds (event e1), but agent 1 thinks
that nothing has happened (event e2). The product update is
calculated as follows:
(M, w1)⊗ (E1, e1) = (w1, e1) :p
0 (w1, e2) :p
0, 1
(w2, e2)
0, 1
1
1 0, 1
In the updated state, agent 0 knows p (since 20p holds at
(w1, e1)), but agent 1 didn’t learn anything (doesn’t know p
and believes that 0 doesn’t either).
2.4 Classes of Epistemic States and Actions
In this article, we consider epistemic states and actions where
the accessibility relations satisfy specific properties, namely
transitivity (for all w, v, u, wRiv and vRiu imply wRiu, de-
fined by the axiom 4: 2iφ → 2i2iφ), Euclidicity (for all
w, v, u, wRiv and wRiu imply vRiu, defined by the axiom
5: ¬2iφ → 2i¬2iφ) and reflexivity (for all w, wRiw, de-
fined by the axiom T: 2iφ → φ). Different conditions on
the accessibility relations correspond to different assumptions
on the notions of knowledge or belief [Fagin et al., 1995;
Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995]. In the sequel we will re-
fer to L-epistemic states and actions, where the conditions on
these models are given in Figure 1.
3 Classical and Epistemic Planning
In this section, we briefly relate the epistemic planning ap-
proach of DEL as propounded in [Bolander and Andersen,
2011; Lo¨we et al., 2011] with the classical planning approach
[Ghallab et al., 2004]. For more detailed connections, we re-
fer the reader to [Bolander and Andersen, 2011].
3.1 Classical Planning
Following [Ghallab et al., 2004], any classical planning do-
main can be represented as a restricted state-transition system
Σ = (S,A, γ), where S is a finite or recursively enumerable
set of states; A is a finite set of actions; γ : S × A ↪→ S is
a partial and computable state-transition function. A classi-
cal planning task is then represented as a triple (Σ, s0, Sg),
where Σ is a restricted state-transition system; s0 is the ini-
tial state, a member of S; Sg is the set of goal states, a subset
of S. A solution to a classical planning task (Σ, s0, Sg) is a
finite sequence of actions (a plan) a1, a2, . . . , an such that:
1. For all i ≤ n, γ(γ(. . . γ(γ(s0, a1), a2), . . . , ai−1), ai) is
defined; 2. γ(γ(. . . γ(γ(s0, a1), a2), . . . , an−1), an) ∈ Sg.
3.2 Epistemic Planning
Definition 6 (Epistemic planning tasks). An epistemic
planning task is a triple (s0, A, φg) where s0 is a finite epis-
temic state, the initial state;A is a finite set of finite epistemic
actions; φg is a formula in L(P,A), the goal formula.
Any epistemic planning task (s0, A, φg) canonically in-
duces a classical planning task ((S,A, γ), s0, Sg) given by:
• S = {s0 ⊗ a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ an | n ≥ 0, ai ∈ A}.
• Sg = {s ∈ S | s |= φg}.
• γ(s, a) =
{
s⊗ a if a is applicable in s
undefined otherwise.
Hence, epistemic planning tasks are special cases of classi-
cal planning tasks. A solution to an epistemic planning task
(s0, A, φg) is a solution to the induced classical planning task.
Example 3. Let a1 denote the epistemic action (E1, e1) of
Example 2 and let a2 denote the result of replacing 0 by 1
and 1 by 0 everywhere in a1. The epistemic action a2 is a
private announcement of p to agent 1. Now consider an epis-
temic planning task (s0, A, φg), where s0 = (M, w1) is the
epistemic state from Example 1, and A ⊇ {a1, a2}. Let the
goal be that both 0 and 1 know p, but don’t know that each
other knows: φg = 20p ∧ 21p ∧ ¬2021p ∧ ¬2120p. It is
easy to check that a solution to this epistemic planning task is
the action sequence a1, a2, since we have s0⊗a1⊗a2 |= φg .
Hence a solution to the task of both agents knowing p with-
out suspecting that each other does, is to first announce p
privately to 0 then privately to 1.
The following definition is adapted from [Erol et al., 1995].
Definition 7 (Plan existence problem). Let n ≥ 1 and
L ∈ {K,K4,K45,S4,S5}. PlanEx(L, n) is the follow-
ing decision problem: “Given an epistemic planning task
T = (s0, A, φg) where s0 is an L-epistemic state, A is a set
of L-epistemic actions and |A| = n, does T have a solution?”
4 Two-counter Machines
We will prove undecidability of the plan existence prob-
lem, PLANEX(L, n), for various classes of epistemic plan-
ning tasks. Each proof is by a reduction of the halting prob-
lem for two-counter machines to the plan existence problem
for the relevant class of planning tasks. So, we first introduce
two-counter machines [Minsky, 1967; Hampson and Kurucz,
2012].
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Definition 8 (Two-counter machines). A two-counter ma-
chine M is a finite sequence of instructions (I0, . . . , IT ),
where each instruction It, for t < T , is from the set
{inc(i), jump(j), jzdec(i, j) | i = 0, 1, j ≤ T}
and IT = halt. A configuration of M is a triple (k, l,m) ∈
N3 with k being the index of the current instruction, and l,m
being the current contents of counters 0 and 1, respectively.
The computation function fM : N → N3 of M maps time
steps into configurations, and is given by fM (0) = (0, 0, 0)
and if fM (n) = (k, l,m) then
fM (n+1) =

(k + 1, l + 1,m) if Ik = inc(0)
(k + 1, l,m+ 1) if Ik = inc(1)
(j, l,m) if Ik = jump(j)
(j, l,m) if Ik = jzdec(0, j) and l = 0
(j, l,m) if Ik = jzdec(1, j) and m = 0
(k + 1, l − 1,m) if Ik = jzdec(0, j) and l > 0
(k + 1, l,m− 1) if Ik = jzdec(1, j) and m > 0
(k, l,m) if Ik = halt .
We say that M halts if fM (n) = (T, l,m) for some n, l,m ∈
N.
Theorem 1. [Minsky, 1967] The halting problem for two-
counter machines is undecidable.
5 Single-agent Epistemic Planning
In this section, we assume that the set A is a singleton.
5.1 The General Case
We encode the halting problem of a two-counter machine M
as an epistemic planning task in three steps: 1. We define the
epistemic models CHAIN(p, n) for encoding natural numbers,
and the epistemic states s(k,l,m) for encoding configurations;
2. We define a finite set of epistemic actions FM for encod-
ing the computation function fM ; 3. We encode the halting
problem as an epistemic planning task using these models.
1. Encoding of configurations. For each propositional sym-
bol p ∈ P and each n ∈ N, we define an epistemic model
φk
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Fig. 7: The action aM (k, l,m)
when Ik = inc(0). The case
Ik = inc(1) is by replacing p2
and p3 everywhere.
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Fig. 8: The action aM (k, l,m)
when Ik = jump(j).
CHAIN(p, n) as in Figure 2. For each (k, l,m) ∈ N3, we de-
fine the epistemic state s(k,l,m) as in Figure 3. It encodes the
configurations (k, l,m) of two-counter machines.
2. Encoding of the computation function. First, we need
some formal preliminaries:
Definition 9 (Path formulas). For every n ∈ N, define γn :=
3n2⊥.
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ N and let (M, w) be an epistemic state.
Then (M, w) |= γn iff there is a path of length n starting in
w and ending in a world with no successor (a sink).
For each propositional symbol p ∈ P and each m,n ∈
N we define three event models INC(p), DEC(p) and
REPL(p, n,m) as in Figures 4–6. We have omitted edge la-
bels, as we are in the single-agent case.
Lemma 2. For all m,n ∈ N, for all p ∈ P ,
1. CHAIN(p, n)⊗ INC(p) = CHAIN(p, n+ 1)
2. if n > 0, CHAIN(p, n)⊗ DEC(p) = CHAIN(p, n− 1)
3. CHAIN(p, n)⊗ REPL(p, n,m) = CHAIN(p,m).
Proof. We only prove item 1. Introducing names for the
nodes and events, we can calculate as follows: CHAIN(p, n)⊗
INC(p) =
w1:p
w2:p
wn+1:p
wn+2:p
n
+
1
⊗
e1 :p ∧ ¬γ0
e2 :p ∧ γ1
e3 :p ∧ γ0
=
(w1,e1):p
(wn+1,e1):p
(wn+1,e2):p
(wn+2,e3):p
n
+
2
= CHAIN(p, n+ 1).
For all k ∈ N, we define φk := 3(p1∧¬γk∧γk+1). Using
Lemma 1 and the definition of s(k,l,m), we immediately get
that for all k, l,m, k′ ∈ N:
s(k,l,m) |= φk′ iff k′ = k. (1)
LetM = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. For all k <
T and all l,m ∈ N, we define an epistemic action aM (k, l,m)
as in Figures 7–10 depending on the values of Ik, l and m. If
k, l,m, k′, l′,m′ ∈ N, we write (k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′) when
the following holds:
k = k′ and
{
l = 0 iff l′ = 0 if Ik = jzdec(0, j)
m = 0 iff m′ = 0 if Ik = jzdec(1, j)
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when Ik = jzdec(0, j), l = 0
or Ik = jzdec(1, j),m = 0.
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Fig. 10: The action aM (k, l,m)
when Ik = jzdec(0, j), l > 0.
Case Ik = jzdec(1, j),m > 0
is by replacing p2 and p3.
Note that when (k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′) then aM (k, l,m) =
aM (k
′, l′,m′), hence the following set is finite:
FM := {aM (k, l,m) | k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, l,m ∈ N} .
Lemma 3 below shows that FM really encodes the computa-
tion steps of the computation function.
Lemma 3. Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine,
l,m, n ∈ N and k < T . Then, the following holds:
1. aM (k, l,m) is applicable in sfM (n) iff (k, l,m) ≈
fM (n);
2. sfM (n) ⊗ aM (fM (n)) = sfM (n+1).
Proof sketch. Assume fM (n) = (k′, l′,m′). Item 1 is by
case of Ik. We only consider the cases Ik = inc(0) and Ik =
jump(j). In these cases, aM (k, l,m) is an epistemic action of
the form (E , e) with pre(e) = φk. Hence using equation (1)
we get: aM (k, l,m) applicable in sfM (n) ⇔ s(k′,l′,m′) |= φk
⇔ k = k′ ⇔ (k, l,m) ≈ (k′, l′,m′) because Ik = inc(0) or
Ik = jump(j). Item 2 is by case of Ik′ . We only consider
the case Ik′ = inc(0): sfM (n) ⊗ aM (fM (n)) = s(k′,l′,m′) ⊗
aM (k
′, l′,m′) = s(k′+1,l′+1,m) = sfM (n+1), using Lemma 2
and that aM (k′, l′,m′) is the epistemic action of Fig. 7.
3. Encoding of the halting problem. From Lemma 3, we
derive the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine.
Define TM as the following epistemic planning task: TM =
(s(0,0,0),FM , φT ). Then TM has a solution iff M halts.
So, from Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we obtain:
Theorem 2. PLANEX(K,1) is undecidable.
5.2 Epistemic Planning for K4, K45, S4 and S5
We can prove an even stronger result than Theorem 2, namely
that the plan existence problem for S4 planning tasks is un-
decidable (for |P | ≥ 2). Due to lack of space, we cannot pro-
vide the proof of this result and we refer the interested reader
to [Aucher and Bolander, 2013] for more details. The proof
is similar to the proof of undecidability of the next section.
Theorem 3. PLANEX(S4, 1) is undecidable.
As a direct corollary of Theorem 3, we have that single-
agent epistemic planning for K4 and KT are also undecidable.
Despite all these negative results, there is still room for de-
cidability in the single-agent case if we assume that knowl-
edge or belief are negatively introspective:
p = p, r
p
p1
0
Fig. 11: META-WORLD(p)
p
p
p
p
p
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1
1
0
Fig. 12: META-CHAIN(p, n)
Theorem 4. PLANEX(K45, 1) and PLANEX(S5, 1) are de-
cidable.
Proof sketch. Any formula of K45 (and hence also of S5)
is provably equivalent to a normal form formula of degree 1
[Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995]. Therefore any planning task
on K45 will induce a state space of finite size (up to bisimu-
lation contraction), and hence we have decidability.
6 Multi-agent Epistemic Planning
In the multi-agent setting, we prove a strong result, namely
that multi-agent epistemic planning is undecidable for any
logic between K and S5. The proof of this undecidability
result generalises the proof for single-agent K given in Sec-
tion 5.1, but we need an extra atomic proposition r (for better
readability, we use four atomic propositions p1, p2, p3 and r,
although we could use only two). The idea underlying the
proof is to replace worlds with meta-worlds, which are in fact
epistemic models.
1. Encoding of configurations. We encode configura-
tions as two-agent S5-epistemic states. The worlds in
CHAIN(p, n) of Figure 2 are replaced with the epistemic mod-
els META-WORLD(p) of Figure 11. The way meta-worlds
are connected to each other to form a META-CHAIN(p, n) is
shown in Figure 12. Then, for each configuration (k, l,m) ∈
N3, we define an epistemic state s′(k,l,m) by replacing in Fig-
ure 3 CHAIN with META-CHAIN and by labeling the accessi-
bility edges originating from the designated world with agent
1. Note that as we are in S5, all relations are equivalence re-
lations, but the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure is
left implicit in figures.
2. Encoding of the computation function. Similarly to the
case of single-agent K, we define path formulas.
Definition 10 (Path formulas). For all p ∈ P and n ∈ N,
we define formulas λn(p), µn(p) and τn(p) inductively by:
λ0(p) := p ∧21¬r
µ0(p) := p ∧30λ0(p) ∧ ¬λ0(p)
τ0(p) := p ∧ r ∧31µ0(p)
λn+1(p) := p ∧31µn(p) ∧ ¬µn(p) ∧ ¬r
µn+1(p) := p ∧30λn+1(p) ∧ ¬λn+1(p)
τn+1(p) := p ∧ r ∧31µn+1(p).
We then obtain a counterpart of Lemma 1:
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p ∧ ¬λ0
p ∧ µ0
p ∧ µ0
p ∧ τ0
p ∧ µ0
0
1
1
0
Fig. 13: META-INC(p)
p ∧ ¬λ0 ∧ ¬µ0 ∧ ¬τ0
Fig. 14: META-DEC(p)
p ∧ τn
p ∧ µn
p ∧ µn
1
0
p ∧ τn
p ∧ µn
p ∧ µn
1
0
1
p ∧ τn
p ∧ µn
p ∧ µn
1
1
0
3(m+1)
events
Fig. 15: META-REPL(p, n,m)
Lemma 5. For all p ∈ P , n ∈ N, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n+3:
META-CHAIN(p, n), wj |= λi(p) ⇔ j = 3n+ 3− 3i
META-CHAIN(p, n), wj |= µi(p) ⇔ j = 3n+ 2− 3i
META-CHAIN(p, n), wj |= τi(p) ⇔ j = 3n+ 1− 3i.
In other words, λi holds in the bottom world of the (i+
1)th to last meta-world of META-CHAIN(p, n), µi in the top
right world of the same meta-world and τi in the top left
world of the same meta-world. Now define META-INC(p),
META-DEC(p) and META-REPL(p, n,m) as in Figures 13–15.
Let M = (I0, . . . , IT ) be a two-counter machine. For
all k < T and all l,m ∈ N, we define an epistemic ac-
tion a′M (k, l,m) as in Figures 7–10 by: 1) replacing INC,
DEC and REPL with META-INC, META-DEC and META-REPL
respectively; 2) labeling the accessibility edges originating
from the designated worlds with agent 1; 3) replacing φk with
31µk(p1); 4) replacing 3(p2 ∧ γ1) with 31µ0(p2).
3. Encoding of the halting problem. If CHAIN, INC,
DEC, aM and s(k,l,m) are replaced in Lemmata 2 and 3 with
META-CHAIN, META-INC, META-DEC, a′M and s
′
(k,l,m) re-
spectively, then these Lemmata still hold. Therefore, Lemma
4 and Theorem 2 also generalize to this two-agent S5 setting,
and we finally obtain that:
Theorem 5. PLANEX(S5, n) is undecidable for any n ≥ 2.
7 DEL Model Checking
The DEL language L∗DEL is defined by the following BNF:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | 2iφ | [pi]φ
pi ::= (E , e) | (pi ∪ pi) | (pi;pi) | pi∗
where p ∈ P , i ∈ A and (E , e) is any epistemic action [van
Ditmarsch et al., 2007]. In DEL, one assumes that |A| >
1. The truth conditions for the programs pi are defined as
follows:
M, w |= [E , e]φ iff M, w |= pre(e) implies
(M, w)⊗ (E , e) |= φ
M, w |= [pi ∪ γ]φ iff M, w |= [pi]φ andM, w |= [γ]φ
M, w |= [pi; γ]φ iff M, w |= [pi][γ]φ
M, w |= [pi∗]φ iff for all finite sequences pi; . . . ;pi,
M, w |= [pi; . . . ;pi]φ
The formula [E , e]φ reads as “after the execution of the epis-
temic action (E , e), it holds that φ”. The model checking
Single-agent Multi-agent
planning planning
K UD UD
KT UD UD
K4 UD UD
K45 D UD
S4 UD UD
S5 D UD
Fig. 16: Summary of results (D=Decidable, UD=UnDecidable)
problem is the following: “Given an epistemic state (M, w),
a formula φ ∈ L∗DEL, is it the case thatM, w |= φ?”. As an
immediate corollary of our results, we have the following the-
orem. It complements the result of [Miller and Moss, 2005]
stating that the satisfiability problem of DEL is undecidable.
Theorem 6. The model checking problem of the language
L∗DEL is undecidable.
Proof. PLANEX(S5, n) is reducible to the model checking
problem of the language L∗DEL: an epistemic planning taskT = (s0, A, φg) has a solution iff s0 |= ¬[A∗]¬φg holds.
8 Conclusion
8.1 Related Work
Alternatives to the DEL-based approach to multi-agent plan-
ning with ToM abilities can be found both in the literature
on temporal epistemic logics [van der Hoek and Wooldridge,
2002] and in the literature on POMDP-based planning [Gmy-
trasiewicz and Doshi, 2005]. However, these alternative for-
malisms express planning tasks in terms of an explicitly given
state space, and hence do not address how to express actions
in a compact and convenient formalism (and how to possi-
bly avoid building the entire state space when solving plan-
ning tasks). In the DEL-based formalism the state space is
induced by the action descriptions as in classical planning.
Note that our assumptions in DEL-based planning correspond
to the infinite horizon case of planning based on POMDPs, in
which already ordinary, single-agent planning is undecidable
[Madani et al., 1999].
8.2 Concluding Remarks
Our results are summarized in the table of Figure 16 (we re-
call that they hold only for |P | ≥ 2). From this table, we no-
tice that in the single-agent setting, the property of Euclidicity
(defined by Axiom 5: ¬2iφ → 2i¬2iφ) draws the border-
line between decidability and undecidability: if 5 is added to
K4 or S4, we immediately obtain decidability.
Given these results, an important quest of course becomes
to find fragments of the formalism in which interesting prob-
lems can still be formulated, but where the complexity is
comparable to the complexity of other standard planning
formalisms (varying from PSPACE-completeness for classi-
cal planning [Bylander, 1994] up to 2-EXP-completeness
for planning under nondeterminism and partial observabil-
ity [Rintanen, 2004]). We leave the quest for decidable frag-
ments to future work. Initial results in this direction can be
found in [Lo¨we et al., 2011].
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